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W.: Internal Revenue--Administrative Law--Finality of Findings of the
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
tiff was undetermined at the time the contract was entered into was
also an obstacle to his claim after his status had been -determined.
But it is settled that if the beneficiary satisfies the other requisites
entitling him to sue it does not matter that he is not named in the
contract, and the fact that he is not known at the time of the
making of.the contract is immaterial. He may even be one of a
2
class of persons, if the class is sufficiently designated.1
The result in Aetna Life Insurance Company of Hartford
Conn. v. Maxwell is correct beyond a doubt. The rules of law governing the status of the plaintiff were clearly against his claim as
a sole beneficiary, and the case adds clarity to the proposition.
H. G. W.
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The stockholders of X
corporation, contemplating a sale of the entire stock of X, organize
a dummy corporation, Y, to which some of the assets of X are
transferred. After the sale, the former stockholders of X, now
stockholders of Y, vote that Y make a "gift or honorarium" to
former employees of X. The commissioner of internal revenue
treated the amount received by B, one of the former employees of
X, as taxable income. This payment was likewise held by the
Board of Tax Appeals to be "compensation," taxable as income,
and not a tax-exempt "gift." ' The circuit court of appeals (one
judge dissenting) upheld the finding of the Board,2 and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari.3 Held (four justices dissenting), that the ultimate finding that this payment constituted compensation involved a question of law, or at least a mixed question
of law and fact, and the Court could look into all the circumstances
and substitute its judgment for that of the Board of Tax Appeals.
Judgment reversed. Bogardus v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue.4
The Revenue Act of 1924, which created the Board of Tax Appeals,5 provided for no appeal from the Board; the result being
that a proceeding before this administrative tribunal was considered
FINDINGS OF TBE BOARD OF TAX ArEA.Ls.-

12 Burton v. Larkin, 36 Kan. 246, 13 Pac. 398 (1887) ; Lemz v. Chicago,
etc.
R. Co., 111 Wis. 198, 86 N. W. 607 (1901); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 139.
145 STAT. 798 (1928), 26 U. S. C. A. § 22 (b) (3).
2Bogardus v. Helvering, 88 P. (2d) 646 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937).
3 57 S. Ct. 790 (1937).
4 58 S. Ct. 61, 5 U. S. L. Week 203 (1937).
r543 STAT. 336 (1924), 26 U. S. C. A. § 600.
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to be merely a preliminary skirmish-" a run for luck"'G-because either party, if dissatisfied, could bring a court action and
get a trial de novo. In 1926 Congress made provisions for a right
of review which was restricted to questions of law.7 Generally
speaking, the courts have construed this statute liberally and have
accorded finality to the findings of fact made by the Board.8 Out
of twenty-one cases decided by the Supreme Court, the decision
of the Board was affirmed in thirteen, and in six of the eight reversals rather clear-cut questions of law were presented.10
The other two cases in the group of reversals referred to above,
which might, at first blush, seem to be indicative of a retrogressive
tendency of the Court, are the recent cases of Helvering v. TexPenn Oi7 Co., 11 and the principal case, Bogardus v. Commissioner.
In the Tex-Penn case, decided some seven months before the Bogardus case, the issue was whether a certain cash sum was a part of
the consideration for the transfer of the stock of a corporation 2
6 Blair v. Curran, 24 F. (2d) 390 (C. C. A. 1st, 1928).
§ 641.
8 Fisher v. Com'r of Internal Revenue, 59 F. (2d) 192 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932);
Lougee v. Com'r, 63 F. (2d) 112 (C. C. A. 1st, 1933); Olson v. Com'r, 67 F.
(2d) 726 (C. C. A. 7th, 1933); Avery v. Com'r, 22 F. (2d) 6 (C. C. A. 5th,
1927); Meinrath Brokerage Co. v. Com'r, 35 F. (2d) 614 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929);
Sheppard & Myers, Inc. v. Com'r, 45 F. (2d) 50 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1930);
Simons Brick Co. v. Com'r, 45 F. (2d) 57 (C. C. A. 9th, 1930); Wright v.
Com'r, 50 F. (2d) 727 (C. C. A. 4th, 1931); Helvering v. Ward, 79 F. (2d)
381 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935).
7 44 STAT. 110 (1926), 26 U. S. C. A.

9 Old Colony Trust Co. v. Com'r of Internal Revenue, 279 U. S. 716, 49
S. Ct. 499 (1929) ; Helvering v. Rankin, 295 U. S. 123, 55 S. Ct. 732 (1935) ;
Snyder v. Com'r, 295 U. S. 134, 55 S. Ct. 737 (1935); Old Mission Portland
Cement Co. v. Helvering, 293 U. S. 289, 55 S. Ct. 158 (1934); Burnet v. Leininger, 285 U. S. 136, 52 S. Ct. 345 (1932); Phillips v. Com'r of Internal Revenue, 283 U. S. 589, 51 S. Ct. 608 (1931); Burnet v. Clark, 287 U. S. 410,
53 S. Ct. 207 (1932) ; Lucas v. Kansas City Structural Steel Co., 281 U. S. 264,
50 S. Ct. 263 (1930); Burnet v. S. & L. Bldg. Corporation, 288 U. S. 406,
53 S. Ct. 428 (1933) ; Elmhurst Cemetery v. Com'r, 300 U. S. 37, 57 S. Ct. 324
(1937); General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U. S. 200, 56
S. Ct. 185 (1935); Hulburd v. Com'r, 296 U. S. 300, 56 S. Ct. 197 (1935);
Palmer v. Com'r, 58 S. Ct. 67, 5 U. S. L. Week 197 (1937).
10 Lucas v. Ox Fibre Brush Co., 281 U. S. 115, 50 S. Ct. 173 (1930) ; Murphy
Oil Co. v. Burnet, 287 U. S. 299, 53 S. Ct. 161 (1932); Helvering v. Salvage,
297 U. S. 106, 56 S. Ct. 375 (1936); Helvering v. Independent Life Ins. Co.,
292 U. S. 371, 54 S. Ct. 758 (1934); Helvering v. Minnesota Tea Co., 290
U. S. 378, 56 S. Ct. 269 (1935); Burnet v. Commonwealth Improvement Co.,
287 U. S. 415, 53 S. Ct. 198 (1932).
11-300 U. S. 481, 57 S. Ct. 569 (1937).
12 58 S. Ct. 61, 5 U. S. L. Week 203 (1937).
1 Under Act, 1918, § 202 (b), 40 STAT. 1060 (1918) and Treasury Regulation 45, art. 1567, had the sole consideration for the transfer been stock, no
taxable income could have been derived from the transfer.
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and therefore taxable as income, or whether this sum was merely
a loan made by the transferee to the transferor. The Board of
Tax Appeals considered the evidence and on the basis thereof made
"probative or evidentiary findings" of fact which almost conclusively proved that the sum was not a part of the consideration for
the transfer. The Board then made an "ultimate finding" that
the sum was a part of the consideration for the transfer and constituted taxable income. This was the first case in which the
Supreme Court was faced with the problem of inconsonance between the probative findings made by the Board and the conclusion drawn from those findings or the "ultimate findings."' 1 It
is submitted that so far as the reviewing court is concerned, the
questions presented by a conclusion drawn from evidentiary findings which are supported by evidence and a conclusion drawn from
uncontroverted facts, are identical, because such evidentiary findings are just as incapable of disputation by the reviewing court as
are agreed facts. Ergo, while a casual reading of the Tex-Penn
case might leave the impression that the reason for reviewing the
findings was that it was an ultimate finding and intrinsically involved a question of law or a mixed question of law and fact, the
true basis of the case is that the question presented was whether
or not the finding was contrary to the evidence, which is a question
of law, being analogous to the question as to whether a verdict of
a jury is contrary to the evidence.
In the Bogardus case the Court quotes from the Tex-Penn case
some language that*might lead one to imply that something akin
to necromancy will inject a question of law or a mixed question
of law and fact into a finding based upon uncontroverted facts, but
no more in this case than in the Tex-Penn case did the Court review the finding of the Board on any such principle. Under the
statute here involved, a payment which was "compensation" was
taxable, while a payment which was a "gift" was tax-exempt; the
facts were of such a nature that lexicographical research was inadequate to determine into which category this payment should
fall- the question was whether the statute should be interpreted
14 Two circuit courts had differed in the solution of this problem. In Washburn v. Com'r, 51 F. (2d) 949 (C. C. A. 8th, 1931), the "ultimate finding"
was held to be a conclusion of law which could be set aside if contrary to the
"probative findings." Triou v. Helvering, 68 F. (2d) 280 (C. C. A. 9th,
1933), and Winnett v. Helvering, 68 F. (2d) 814 (C. C. A. 9th, 1934), say
that evidentiary facts cannot be used to overcome the finding of ultimate fact
unless they compel an opposite conclusion as a matter of law.
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to include such a payment as this in the term "gift"; therefore
the question was one of statutory interpretation, which is a question of law. The argument made in the dissenting opinion is that
the sole differentiating factor between a payment which is a gift
and a payment which is compensation is the intent with which
the payment is made, and intent is always a question of fact. This
would be perfectly correct if it were conceded that the statutory
tax-exempt "gift" is the same as the ordinary gift referred to in
the law of personal property, but whether such be the case calls
for a judicial interpretation of the statute and the consequent decision of a question of law. Hence the Bogardus case may be reconciled on the basis that it involved a question of statutory interpretation, although this is not clearly set forth in the opinion.
H. A. W., JR.

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS -

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPmIED

TO QUASI-CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS ARISING UPON ANTICIPATORY BREACH
OF AN EXISTING CONTRACT. - Plaintiff paid defendant premiums

on three industrial insurance policies from November, 1921, to
September, 1932. In 1932, the plaintiff's request for payment of
the cash value of the policies was refused on the ground that the
policies had lapsed in 1921, 1922, and 1925 respectively. The
plaintiff had no knowledge or notice of this fact and in 1935 instituted this action in quasi contract to recover the premiums paid
since the policies lapsed. Defendant pleaded the Statute of Limitations on the theory that the Statute commenced to run when
the defendant treated the policies as having lapsed.' "Held,that
the Statute begins to run only when the injured party manifests
his intention to treat the anticipatory repudiation as a "rescission"
or as a breach. Harless v. Western and Southern Life Insurance
Co.,
West Virginia has frequently upheld a right of action based
3
on an anticipatory repudiation of an executory contract and now
joins a majority of other courts in allowing suit upon a repudiation
1 It was conceded that the five year statute of limitations was the correct
limitation to apply in this case. W. VA. REv. CODE (Mihie, 1937) e. 55, art.
2, § 6.,
2192 S. E. 137 (W. Va. 1937).
3 Davis v. Grand Rapids School Furniture Co., 41 W. Va. 717, 24 S. E. 630
(1896); Connolly v. Bollinger, 67 W. Va. 37, 67 S. E. 71 (1910). For a complete discussion of W. Va. cases see Riley, Anticipatory Breach in West Virginia (1925) 31 W. VA. L. Q. 182.
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